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Abstract 
This study investigates whether information sharing channels that are meant to reduce 
information asymmetry have led to an increase in financial access. The study employs a 
Generalised Method of Moments technique using data from 53 African countries during the 
period from 2004-2011 to examine this linkage. Information sharing channels are 
theoretically designed to promote the formal financial sector and discourage the informal 
financial sector. The study uses two information sharing channels: private credit bureaus and 
public credit registries. The study found that both information sharing channels have a 
positive and significant impact on financial access. The study also found that public credit 
registries complement the formal financial sector to promote financial access. The policy 
implications are discussed. 
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1. Introduction  
 Three main tendencies in policy and scholarly circles motivate this study: (i) the need 
for domestic finance (or access to credit) to accommodate the growing investment needs in 
Africa and the shortcomings in the literature on financial development; (ii) the postulated 
concerns of increasing information asymmetry (or the issues of the lack of information 
sharing between banks) and the surplus liquidity associated with financial institutions on the 
continent; and (iii) the gaps in the literature on financialisation (or the improvement of one 
financial sector to the detriment of other financial sectors).  
 First, a substantial bulk of African business literature is consistent with the position 
that a fundamental challenge to doing business on the continent is the lack of finance (Tuomi, 
2011; Darley, 2012; Fanta, 2016). This position has recently been confirmed by Ndikumana 
and Blackson (2015), who have shown that domestic investment in Africa is more positively 
linked to domestic sources of capital when compared with external sources of capital. The 
authors recommended that African countries primarily look inward for “domestic savings 
mobilisation” as a sustainable mechanism to domestic investment instead of the over-reliance 
on imported capital.  
This study incorporates this requirement of domestic sources of finance by conceiving and 
defining financial access as the ability of financial intermediaries to transform mobilised 
savings into credit for investment purposes. The motivation for emphasising this dimension of 
financial allocation efficiency also builds on the evidence that the literature has largely failed 
to appreciate financial development from the perspective of the bank’s ability to fulfil its 
fundamental role of transforming mobilised financial resources into credit for investment 
purposes (Kablan, 2010; Batuo & Kupukile, 2010). For instance, most indicators of financial 
efficiency have focused on cost efficiency (Chen, 2009), data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
for technical efficiency (Kablan, 2009) and profit efficiency (Hauner & Peiris, 2005).  
 Second, the need for internal sources of finance unfortunately contrasts with the 
substantially documented concerns of excess liquidity in African financial institutions 
(Saxegaard, 2006; Asongu, 2014a). A fundamental reason for the surplus liquidity is the 
information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. To tackle the concern of surplus 
liquidity, over the past decade, information sharing offices (ISOs), such as public credit 
registries (PCRs) and private credit bureaus (PCBs)2, have been introduced across the 
continent (Triki & Gajigo, 2014). This study incorporates this dimension of the motivation by 
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 ISO is used interchangeably with ‘PCR and PCB’.  
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considering a broad set of African countries and employing ISOs as a policy variable for 
reducing information asymmetry in order to enhance financial access. Moreover, the extant 
literature on ISOs has largely focused on developed countries and the emerging nations of 
Asia and Latin America, while by extension, the African continent has not received the 
scholarly attention that it deserves (Galindo & Miller, 2001; Love & Mylenko, 2003; Barth et 
al., 2009).  
 The policy relevance of ISOs in the financial sector competition for financial access 
has not been covered in the literature. For instance, Love and Mylenko (2003) have concluded 
that private registries are linked to higher bank lending and lower financial access constraints, 
whereas the impact of public registries is not apparent. Singh et al. (2009) conclude that 
African nations with ISOs enjoy higher levels of access to finance. Triki and Gajigo (2014) 
have established that, compared to PCRs, PCBs are associated with higher levels of financial 
access. Asongu et al. (2016) show that ISOs have influenced access to finance negatively, 
whereas Asongu et al. (2017a) conclude that technology-driven information sharing is 
relevant in driving financial access. Muaza and Alagidede (2017) conclude that, compared to 
countries with French civil law traditions, their counterparts with English common law 
traditions are benefiting more from financial access from the introduction of ISOs. Kusi et al. 
(2017) have established that ISOs reduce bank credit risk in high- and low-income countries 
in Africa, while Kusi and Opoku‐ Mensah (2018) have concluded that the presence, quality 
and coverage of ISOs decreases funding costs in Africa.  
Third, the concept of financialisation in the information asymmetry literature is sparse. 
Consistent with O’Toole (2014) and Asongu (2015a), the bulk of the literature has been 
restricted to more specific areas of financial development such as bank concentration and 
bank participation. We depart from this strand of literature by engaging financialisation 
measurements within the framework of financial sector competition. In so doing, we articulate 
a neglected informal financial sector. The introduction of the financialisation concepts (which 
are substantively discussed in Section 2) merges two branches of research by concurrently 
contributing to the literature on measuring development finance and to the economic 
development literature on the policy relevance of ISO in the financial sector competition for 
financial access. The simultaneous contribution provides a practical means for understanding 
the mechanisms by which financial access is influenced by the complementarity between 
various financial sectors and ISOs.  
Building on the above, this study examines the role of ISOs in the financial 
competition for financial access using a panel of 53 African countries for the period from 
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2004-2011. The empirical evidence is based on the Generalised Method of Moments. The role 
of ISOs in modulating the effect of financial sector competition on financial access is assessed 
by means of interactive regressions in which the information sharing offices are policy 
variables, while the financial sector competition dynamics are factors to be modulated for 
financial access. This modelling approach is consistent with the recent literature, notably, the 
role of financial access in modulating the effect of education and lifelong learning on 
inequality (Tchamyou, 2018) and the role of information and communication technology 
(ICT) in modulating the effect of environmental degradation on inclusive development 
(Asongu et al., 2017b).  
The following main finding is established. Public credit registries complement 
financial sector formalisation to enhance the financial access in the banking sector and 
financial system. The rest of the study is structured as follows. The theoretical underpinnings 
and clarification of concepts are covered in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the data and 
methodology. The empirical results are covered in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes with 
implications and future research directions.  
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings and conceptual clarifications 
2.1 Theoretical underpinnings: information asymmetry and financial access 
 This section on the theoretical underpinnings is discussed in two main strands: (i) the 
theoretical connection between reducing information asymmetry (by means of ISOs) and 
financial access, and (ii) the theoretical foundation motivating the interaction between 
financial sector competition and ISOs for financial access. In other words, while the former 
strand discusses the broad theoretical literature on the connection between information 
asymmetry and access to finance, the latter strand substantiates how the theoretical connection 
can be extended to the positioning of this study, notably, on the assessment of the role of ISOs 
in modulating the relevance of financial sector competition in financial access within a 
framework of interactive regressions.  
 The theoretical nexus between information asymmetry and financial access can be 
seen from three main perspectives. According to Jappelli and Pagano (2002) and Asongu and 
Nwachwukwu (2018), the exchange of information on borrowers in order to reduce 
information asymmetry has three theoretical or potential effects. First, from the perspectives 
of public credit registries and private credit bureaus, ISOs enable banks to establish a more 
accurate prediction of the repayment probabilities of borrowers. This is essentially because 
banks are better informed on borrowers’ characteristics by means of these information sharing 
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mechanisms. Moreover, such information sharing reduces the adverse selection from a bank, 
which pushes banks to increase interest rates charged on loans in order to mitigate the risks 
associated with limited information on borrowers’ characteristics.  
Second, by sharing information on borrowers’ features, ISOs reduce informational 
rents that would have been extracted from customers by banks. Hence, the sharing of 
information increases the competition between banks in the credit market. The characteristics 
of such competition include the following: loan pricing through interest rates, borrowers’ 
incentives to repay, and competition between financial sectors.  
Third, on the specific premise of incentives to repay, ISOs also play the role of 
disciplining borrowers on the imperative of complying with their debt-related financial 
obligations towards banks. Hence, by acting as a disciplining device, ISOs reduce the moral 
hazard on the part of borrowers by providing them with incentives to perform and repay. In 
essence, all borrowers are disciplined by ISOs on the fact that defaulting on their debts will 
give them limited access to credit markets on the one hand, and on the other make access to 
credit more difficult for them.          
 The discussed three perspectives on the link between information asymmetry and 
financial access can be summarised in terms of the issues confronting banks ex ante and ex 
post of the lending activity. These issues are, respectively, adverse selection on the part of 
banks and moral hazard on the part of borrowers. We substantiate these two major issues in 
chronological order.  
 The primary objective of decreasing information asymmetry builds on a model of pure 
adverse selection developed by Pagano and Jappelli (1993). According to the model, 
information sharing decreases borrower default, increases the number of borrowers and 
reduces “average interest rates”. Moreover, the concern about adverse selection could result 
from the fact that banks have less information on the characteristics of a category of 
borrowers, such as immigrants compared to nationals. Hence, exchanging such information 
by means of ISOs can improve lending by banks to immigrants.  
With regard to the impact on moral hazard, the sharing of information by ISOs 
enhances the incentives of borrowers not to default on their debts either through a discipline 
effect or via the reduction in the rents of banks. On the latter effect, exchanging information 
between financial institutions reduces informational rents that banks extract when lending to 
borrowers (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002) or erodes the rents enjoyed by the incumbent bank when 
access to hard information by the competing bank increases (Petersen & Rajan, 1995; 
Hauswald & Marquez, 2003). The former effect articulates the role of ISOs as a discipline 
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device on borrowers, notably, by providing incentives to borrowers to perform and comply 
with their financial obligations towards financial institutions.  
 The second part of this section focuses on the connection between information 
asymmetry, financial sector competition and financial access. Articulating such a connection 
is relevant in order to situate the relevance of the theoretical framework (covered in the first 
part) to the positioning of this study, notably on the role of information sharing offices in 
modulating the effect of the financial sector competition for financial access. The underlying 
connection is logical to follow in light of the established theoretical role of ISOs in 
stimulating financial sector competition that is discussed in the first part. Hence, within the 
framework of this study, ISOs can be used as a policy variable that stimulates the financial 
sector competition in order to increase financial access.  
  
2.2 Propositions on financialisation   
 
 The propositions build on the insufficiencies in the conception and definition of the 
financial system by the International Financial Statistics (IFS), which does not incorporate the 
informal financial sector (Asongu, 2014b; IMF, 2008). The literature has substantially 
documented the role of the informal sector in development outcomes (Aryeetey, 2005; Adeusi 
et al., 2012). Therefore, the propositions in Table 1 challenge the existing IFS conception of 
the financial system from three principal dimensions, namely, by the following: (i) 
incorporating the informal financial sector into the definition and measurement of the 
financial system, (ii) disentangling the existing measurement into its semi-formal and formal 
components, and (iii) introducing the notion of financialisation within the framework of 
financial sector competition. The propositions are increasingly being employed in the 
financial development literature (Asongu, 2015a, 2015b).  
 Whereas Panel A of Table 1 presents financial development indicators that are based 
on Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the measurements provided in Panel B are those of the 
financial sector’s importance. The latter framework articulates the concept of financialisation 
in the perspectives of formalisation, informalisation, semi-formalisation and non-
formalisation. For example, financial semi-formalisation is the development of the semi-
formal financial sector to the detriment of the formal and informal financial sectors. In other 
words, it implies that the semi-formal financial sector is experiencing an increase in money 
supply shares to the detriment of other financial sectors. In a nutshell, the concept of 
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financialisation denotes the improvement of the money supply shares in one financial sector 
to the detriment of other competing sectors.  
 
 
Table 1: Summary of propositions 
Panel A: GDP-based financial development indicators 
Propositions Name(s) Formula Elucidation 
Proposition 1 Formal financial 
development  
Bank deposits/GDP Bank deposits here refer to demand, time 
and saving deposits in deposit money 
banks. 
Proposition 2 Semi-formal 
financial 
development 
(Financial deposits – 
Bank deposits)/ GDP 
Financial deposits are demand, time and 
saving deposits in deposit money banks 
and other financial institutions. 
Proposition 3 Informal financial 
development 
(Money Supply – 
Financial deposits)/GDP 
 
 
Proposition 4 
Informal and semi-
formal financial 
development  
(Money Supply – Bank 
deposits)/GDP 
 
Panel B: Measures of financial sector importance 
Proposition 5 Financial 
intermediary 
formalisation 
Bank deposits/ Money 
Supply (M2) 
From ‘informal and semi-formal’ to formal 
financial development (formalisation). 
Proposition 6 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalisation’ 
(Financial deposits - 
Bank deposits)/ Money 
Supply 
From ‘informal and formal’ to semi-formal 
financial development (Semi-
formalisation). 
Proposition 7 Financial 
intermediary 
‘informalisation’ 
(Money Supply – 
Financial deposits)/ 
Money Supply 
From ‘formal and semi-formal’ to informal 
financial development (Informalisation). 
Proposition 8 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalisation and 
informalisation’  
(Money Supply – Bank 
Deposits)/Money Supply  
From ‘formal’ to semi-formal and informal 
financial development: (Semi-formalisation 
and informalisation)  
N.B: Propositions 5, 6, and 7 add up to unity (one), which arithmetically spells out the underlying assumption of 
sector importance. Hence, when their time series properties are considered in the empirical analysis, the 
evolution of one sector is to the detriment of other sectors and vice versa.  
Source: Asongu (2015a).   
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 The study examines a panel of 53 African countries with data from the African 
Development Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database 
(FDSD) of the World Bank for the period from 2004-2011. The reasons for positioning the 
study on Africa have already been discussed in the introduction. The data on ISOs start from 
the year 2004, whereas the latest date in the FDSD is 2011 (at the time of the study). ISOs are 
public credit registries (PCR) and private credit bureaus (PCB) (Triki & Gajigo, 2014).   
 Two financial sector competition indicators are employed: Proposition 7 (or financial 
sector informalisation) and Proposition 5 (or financial sector formalisation). Whereas 
Proposition 6 (or financial sector semi-formalisation) is not used because of constraints in the 
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degrees of freedom, Proposition 8 (or financial sector non-formalisation) displays a 
substantial degree of substitution with Proposition 7.    
 Two sets of financial indicators that are consistent with the policy syndrome of surplus 
liquidity in financial institutions are employed. First, credit availability or financial allocation 
activity is measured with (i) banking system activity (“private domestic credit by deposit 
banks”) and (ii) financial system activity (“private domestic credit by deposit banks and other 
financial institutions”). Second, financial allocation efficiency, which appreciates the ability 
to transform mobilised deposits into credit, is measured with (i) banking-system-efficiency 
(“banking system credit” on “banking system deposits”) and (ii) financial-system-efficiency 
(“financial system credit” on “financial system deposits”). 
 We account for the potential biases in omitted variables by using six control variables: 
the lagged dependent variable, GDP growth, inflation, foreign aid, trade and public 
investment (Osabuohein & Efobi, 2013; Asongu, 2014c). After a pilot assessment, controlling 
for more than six variables leads to instrument proliferation and the subsequent invalidity of 
the estimated models because the numbers of instruments are higher than the number of cross-
sections in specifications. We discuss the expected signs in the light of empirical literature.  
 Trade openness is positively linked to financial development (Huang & Temple, 
2005). Investment is also positively related to the outcome variable (Huang, 2011). Both 
empirical (Boyd et al., 2001) and theoretical (Huybens & Smith, 1999) studies are in 
accordance with the perspective that countries with substantially high inflation are linked with 
smaller, less active and less efficient banks. There is also some consensus in the literature on 
the positive relationship between growth and the outcome variable (Jaffee & Levonian, 2001). 
This is essentially because economic growth is related to enhancing financial intermediation 
due to, inter alia, boosted competition and the availability of more funds for productive 
investments. Development assistance is, in principle, expected to increase financial 
development because it is theoretically meant to mitigate the savings-investment gaps in less-
developed countries (Easterly, 2005). The definitions of variables, summary statistics and the 
correlation matrix are available upon request.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Specification  
 A Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal deviations is 
adopted as the empirical strategy. The specification is the Roodman (2009ab) extension of 
Arellano and Bover (1995), which limits instrument proliferation and controls for cross-
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sectional dependence. Moreover, the two primary conditions for the employment of the GMM 
technique are satisfied because of the following: (i) the financial access dependent variables 
are persistent, given that their correlations with corresponding lags are higher than the rule of 
thumb threshold of 0.800 and (ii) the number of time series (T=8) is less than the number of 
cross sections (N=53). Therefore, N>T (Tchamyou et al., 2018).  
The following equations of the levels (1) and the first difference (2) summarise the 
estimation procedure.  
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where tiFin ,  is the financial access (financial allocation activity or efficiency)3 of country i
 
at 
period t , tiFSC ,  is the financial sector competition (financial formalisation and 
informalisation) of country i
 
at period t , ISO  represents the information sharing offices 
(public credit registries or private credit bureaus), Inter  represents the interaction between 
FSCs and ISOs,
 
W  is the vector of five control variables (inflation, foreign aid, trade, public 
investment, and GDP growth),
 
0 is a constant,
 
 represents the coefficient of autoregression, 
which is one in this case, i
 
is the country-specific effect, t
 
is the time-specific constant and 
ti ,  is the error term. A two-step specification is adopted instead of the one-step approach 
because it accounts for heteroscedasticity.  
Consistent with Brambor et al. (2006), all constitutive terms are involved in the 
specification and the interactive estimates are interpreted as marginal impacts. As discussed in 
the introduction, an interactive empirical strategy is adopted because it enables the study to 
investigate the main concern motivating the study: the role of information sharing offices in 
modulating the effect of financial sector competition on financial access.  
 
3.2.2 Identification and exclusion restrictions  
 All independent variables are suspected to be endogenous or predetermined 
(Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017b; Boateng et al., 2018). Therefore, whereas the gmmstyle is 
employed for the predetermined indicators, only the years are treated as strictly exogenous, 
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 In the study, financial access is proxied with financial activity and financial allocation efficiency. 
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and the procedure for treating the ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ because it is not very 
likely for the years to become endogenous in the first-difference (Roodman, 2009b). 
 To tackle the concern of simultaneity, lagged regressors are employed as instruments 
for forward-differenced variables. Accordingly, fixed effects are removed because they can 
influence the investigated nexuses. Helmet transformations that are performed entail the 
forward mean-differencing of the variables in which the mean of future observations are 
subtracted from the variables instead of subtracting the previous observations from those that 
are contemporary (Asongu & De Moor, 2017). Orthogonal and parallel conditions between 
lagged values and forward-differenced variables are ensured with the underlying 
transformations. 
 On the exclusion restriction, the years that are treated as strictly exogenous are 
expected to influence the outcome variable exclusively via endogenous explanatory variables. 
The statistical relevance of the exclusion restriction is investigated with the Difference in 
Hansen Test (DHT) for instrumental exogeneity. In essence, the alternative hypothesis of the 
test should be rejected for the instruments to elucidate the dependent variable exclusively via 
the endogenous explaining variables.  
 It is relevant to note that in the standard instrumental variable (IV) procedure, rejecting 
the alternative hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test implies that 
the instruments elucidate the outcome variable exclusively via the examined mechanisms or 
the explanatory variables. While this information criterion has been employed in the literature 
using an IV estimation technique (Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016), in the 
adopted GMM procedure, the DHT is employed to examine whether the years exhibit strict 
exogeneity by explaining financial access exclusively via the proposed endogenous 
explaining variable or channels. In the light of the above, the validity of the exclusion 
restriction in the findings is confirmed if the alternative DHT hypothesis related to IV (year, 
eq(diff)) is rejected.  
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Presentation of results  
The empirical analysis is presented in two levels. Table 2 shows the findings related to 
financial allocation activity, while Table 3 reveals those that are related to financial allocation 
efficiency. Four post-estimation diagnostic tests are used to assess the validity of the models 
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(Asongu & De Moor, 2017)4. The findings are discussed in three stages, notably in terms of 
the marginal impacts, the net effects and the thresholds at which the marginal impacts with 
ISOs change the sign of the unconditional financialisation impact. Moreover, for an 
investigated threshold to have any economic significance, it is supposed to be within the range 
of the corresponding minimum to maximum values provided by the summary statistics. For 
instance, in the last specification of Table 2, (i) the marginal effect of PCBs on financial 
informalisation for financial system activity is 0.136, (ii) the corresponding net effect is -
15.397 ([4.223 ×0.136] -15.972)5 and (iii) the threshold at which the positive marginal effect 
changes the unconditional negative effect of financial informalisation (-15.972) from negative 
to positive is 117.441 (15.972/0.136). Unfortunately, the positive threshold is not within the 
PCB range (0.000 to 64.80) that is disclosed in the summary statistics.  
 The following findings can be established for Table 2 on the linkages between 
financial activity, financialisation and information asymmetry. First, on the left-hand-side 
(LHS) related to banking system activity, (i) the PCRs interact with financial formalisation to 
produce a positive marginal effect, (ii) the corresponding net effect is positive, while (iii) a 
positive synergy is apparent instead of a threshold because both the unconditional and 
conditional effects are positive. Second, still on the LHS, (i) the PCBs interact with financial 
informalisation to produce a positive marginal impact, (ii) the corresponding net effect is 
negative, and (iii) the positive threshold is not within the range. Third, the findings on the 
LHS of the banking system activity are confirmed by those on the right-hand side (RHS) of 
the financial system activity. Fourth, the significant control variables have the expected signs.  
In Table 3, on the linkages between financial efficiency, financialisation and 
information asymmetry, no valid inferences can be derived from the RHS at the 1% 
significance level because the post-estimation diagnostic tests reveal the presence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals. On the LHS, the two specifications in which post-estimation 
autocorrelation are absent have either an unconditional or a conditional effect that is 
insignificant.  
                                                          
4
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for 
the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second, the Sargan and Hansen 
Overidentification Restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are that the 
instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust 
but is not weakened by the instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but is weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict the identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that the instruments are 
lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for 
the exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of the results from the Hansen OIR test. 
Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of the estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 
2017, p. 200). 
5
 4.223 is the mean value of PCBs.  
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Table 2: Financial Activity, Financial Sector Competition and Information Asymmetry   
         
 Financial Activity 
         
 Banking System Activity (Pcrb) Financial System Activity (Pcrbof) 
 Proposition 5 Proposition 7 Proposition 5 Proposition 7 
 PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCB 
Constant  -22.324*** -11.701*** -0.548 3.174*** -20.150*** -11.311*** 1.379 3.894*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.619) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.193) (0.002) 
Banking System Activity (-1) 1.004*** 1.027*** 1.012*** 0.995*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Financial System Activity (-1) --- --- --- --- 1.020*** 1.043*** 1.061*** 1.008*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) -0.278** --- -0.007 --- -0.367* --- -0.063** --- 
 (0.047)  (0.773)  (0.055)  (0.020)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) --- 0.019 --- -0.065*** --- -0.004 --- -0.068*** 
  (0.795)  (0.000)  (0.958)  (0.000) 
Proposition 5  24.944*** 13.259*** --- --- 20.668*** 13.087*** --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)   
Proposition 7 --- --- -5.126*** -16.860*** --- --- -5.945** -15.972*** 
   (0.001) (0.000)   (0.019) (0.000) 
PCR×Proposition 5 0.290** --- --- --- 0.372* --- --- --- 
 (0.037)    (0.064)    
PCB×Proposition 5 --- -0.090 --- --- --- -0.069 --- --- 
  (0.255)    (0.460)   
PCR×Proposition 7 --- --- 0.167 --- --- --- 0.449 --- 
   (0.630)    (0.172)  
PCB×Proposition 7 --- --- --- 0.164*** --- --- --- 0.136** 
    (0.001)    (0.013) 
GDP growth  -0.057* -0.032** 0.004 -0.061*** -0.028 -0.027 -0.0002 -0.053** 
 (0.074) (0.042) (0.796) (0.004) (0.417) (0.177) (0.991) (0.026) 
Inflation -0.003 -0.008 -0.010 -0.022 -0.010 -0.009 -0.022 -0.021 
 (0.843) (0.440) (0.395) (0.214) (0.487) (0.536) (0.151) (0.148) 
Public Investment  0.135*** 0.082*** 0.042* 0.037 0.140*** 0.075*** 0.097*** 0.047** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.089) (0.117) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.039) 
Foreign Aid  0.080*** 0.045* 0.034 0.061** 0.074** 0.044* -0.022 0.059*** 
 (0.002) (0.072) (0.121) (0.012) (0.015) (0.068) (0.435) (0.008) 
Trade  0.024* 0.009 0.017 0.017* 0.025** 0.002 -0.015* 0.003 
 (0.069) (0.174) (0.144) (0.064) (0.016) (0.680) (0.075) (0.760) 
         
Net Effect with PCR 25.568 --- na --- 24.469 --- na --- 
Net Effect with PCB --- na --- -16.167 --- na --- -15.397 
Thresholds (-/+) (of ISO) Synergy(+) na na 102.804(+) Synergy(+) na na 117.441(+) 
         
AR(1) (0.040) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.063) (0.026) (0.039) (0.020) 
AR(2) (0.809) (0.332) (0.443) (0.375) (0.446) (0.317) (0.244) (0.361) 
Sargan OIR (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.289) (0.197) (0.090) (0.155) (0.202) (0.142) (0.265) (0.196) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.343) (0.274) (0.302) (0.442) (0.295) (0.228) (0.321) (0.416) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.304) (0.231) (0.087) (0.114) (0.225) (0.185) (0.289) (0.163) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.583) (0.283) (0.314) (0.362) (0.372) (0.254) (0.367) (0.311) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.079) (0.188) (0.036) (0.073) (0.115) (0.128) (0.203) (0.157) 
         
Fisher  30120*** 55281*** 34645*** 35105*** 87129*** 119244*** 72114*** 76451*** 
Instruments  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  260 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 
         
*, **, and ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for the Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold: 1) The significance of the 
estimated coefficients, the Hausman test and the Fisher statistics, and 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of a) no autocorrelation in 
the AR(1) and AR(2) tests, and b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 
Proposition 5: Financial Sector Formalisation. Proposition 7: Financial Sector Informalisation.  
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Table 3: Financial Efficiency, Financial Sector Competition and Information Asymmetry   
         
 Financial Efficiency 
         
 Banking System Efficiency (BcBd) Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 
 Proposition 5 Proposition 7 Proposition 5 Proposition 7 
 PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCB 
Constant  14.808* 20.753*** 13.071*** 26.516*** -32.250*** -25.956*** 21.094*** 31.415*** 
 (0.071) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Banking System Efficiency (-1) 0.888*** 0.873*** 0.915*** 0.862*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Financial System Efficiency (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.913* 0.912*** 0.879*** 0.869*** 
     (0.053) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) -0.998 --- 0.349*** --- 0.857* --- -0.187** --- 
 (0.303)  (0.000)  (0.053)  (0.011)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) --- -0.253 --- -0.002 --- -0.444 --- -0.249*** 
  (0.574)  (0.916)  (0.253)  (0.000) 
Proposition 5  9.529 3.664 --- --- 57.349*** 49.770*** --- --- 
 (0.170) (0.395)   (0.000) (0.000)   
Proposition 7 --- --- 3.588 9.411* --- --- -33.790*** -46.780*** 
   (0.507) (0.079)   (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR×Proposition 5 1.349 --- --- --- -0.941* --- --- --- 
 (0.202)    (0.053)    
PCB× Proposition 5 --- 0.496*** --- --- --- 0.225 --- --- 
  (0.000)    (0.602)   
PCR× Proposition 7 --- --- -1.941** --- --- --- 2.226*** --- 
   (0.030)    (0.000)  
PCB×Proposition 7 --- --- --- -0.056 --- --- --- -0.027 
    (0.737)    (0.823) 
GDP growth  0.414*** 0.496*** 0.547*** 0.351*** 0.351*** 0.265*** 0.367*** 0.181*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) 
Inflation -0.133*** -0.081** -0.112*** -0.131*** -0.092** -0.075* -0.089** -0.114** 
 (0.001) (0.037) (0.005) (0.000) (0.029) (0.099) (0.013) (0.012) 
Public Investment  -0.106 -0.167* -0.084 -0.096 0.074 -0.054 -0.021 -0.024 
 (0.280) (0.077) (0.414) (0.500) (0.302) (0.430) (0.719) (0.734) 
Foreign Aid  -0.153 -0.125 -0.102 -0.158 0.015 0.051 -0.038 -0.055 
 (0.220) (0.160) (0.363) (0.136) (0.863) (0.586) (0.605) (0.503) 
Trade  -0.141*** -0.116*** -0.081*** -0.151*** -0.058** -0.048** 1.336* -0.100*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.019) (0.035) (0.075) (0.003) 
         
Net Effect with PCR na --- na --- 55.321 --- -28.992 --- 
Net Effect with PCB --- na --- na --- na --- na 
Thresholds of ISO (-/+) na 7.378(+) 1.848(-) na -60.944(-) na 15.179(+) na 
         
AR(1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.126) (0.058) (0.093) (0.046) 
AR(2) (0.095) (0.112) (0.099) (0.111) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.017) 
Sargan OIR (0.596) (0.141) (0.467) (0.198) (0.153) (0.011) (0.001) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.586) (0.708) (0.732) (0.413) (0.337) (0.171) (0.331) (0.472) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.817) (0.545) (0.794) (0.342) (0.257) (0.073) (0.083) (0.133) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.362) (0.682) (0.551) (0.461) (0.436) (0.440) (0.698) (0.776) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.622) (0.369) (0.659) (0.376) (0.346) (0.188) (0.215) (0.523) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.387) (1.000) (0.637) (0.471) (0.364) (0.291) (0.677) (0.337) 
         
Fisher  332.86*** 1067.06*** 182.71*** 454.76*** 376.69*** 21340*** 593.02*** 2871.28*** 
Instruments  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  263 263 263 263 260 260 260 260 
         
*, **, and ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for the Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold: 1) The significance of the 
estimated coefficients, the Hausman test and the Fisher statistics, and 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of a) no autocorrelation in 
the AR(1) and AR(2) tests, and b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 
Proposition 5: Financial Sector Formalisation. Proposition 7: Financial Sector Informalisation.  
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4.2 Discussion of results  
This section on the discussion of the results is covered in three main strands: (i) the 
comparatively high coefficient of Proposition 5, (ii) the relevance of the findings in the light 
of the contending strands in the more general literature, and (iii) the comparison of the results 
with the African-centric literature. The points are substantiated in chronological order.  
 First, the comparatively high coefficient corresponding to Proposition 5 can be 
explained by the weight of the formal financial sector compared to the informal financial 
sector in the money supply. It is important to note that Proposition 5 represents the progress of 
the formal financial sector to the detriment of the semi-formal and informal financial sectors, 
whereas Proportion 7 denotes the evolution of the informal financial sector at the expense of 
the formal and semi-formal financial sectors. Given that the effects are also contingent on the 
conditioning information set, it is also reasonable to extend the explanation to the fact that the 
formal financial sector is more associated with elements of the conditioning information set 
when compared with the informal financial sector. 
Second, with regard to the connection of the findings with broad strands of the 
literature, it is reasonable to infer that the findings on financial activity are largely consistent 
with the stream of literature supporting the positive role of ISOs in stimulating financial 
access (Padilla & Pagano, 2000; Jappelli & Pagano, 2002, 2006; Bennardo et al., 2015; 
Asongu et al. 2017a, 2018), whereas the results on financial allocation efficiency are largely 
in line with the contrasting stream on the negatives of ISOs (Karapetyan & Stacescu, 2014a; 
Jappelli & Pagano, 2006; Karapetyan & Stacescu, 2014b; Asongu et al., 2016). It is important 
to note that this comparative emphasis in light of the extant conflicting literature is 
exclusively based on the significant findings from regressions related to financial activity 
relative to insignificant results pertaining to financial allocation efficiency. 
The conception and measurement of the financial access variables can also elucidate 
their relative significance in the empirics. While financial activity can be considered as a de 
facto measurement of financial access because it represents the access to credit in real terms, 
financial allocation efficiency can be conceived as a de jure measurement of financial access 
because access to credit is contingent on the ability of banks to transform their mobilised 
deposits into credit for economic operators. Unfortunately, financial constraints are less 
associated with financial activity compared to financial allocation efficiency, such as the 
determinants of surplus liquidity in financial institutions that are not exclusively limited to 
information asymmetry. For instance, while there are voluntary and involuntary motives for 
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holding surplus liquidity in banks, asymmetric information is only one aspect of the 
involuntary motive (Asongu, 2014c, p. 70).  
Third, we now discuss how the findings reflect the African-specific literature as 
covered in the introduction. The findings are broadly consistent with Singh et al. (2009), who 
have concluded that African countries with ISOs for financial institutions enjoy higher levels 
of financial development. They are also in line with Galindo and Miller (2001) in the 
perspective that credit registries are more positively associated with financial access 
compared to credit bureaus. Conversely, the findings run counter to Love and Mylenko 
(2003), who have shown that, whereas the presence of private registries is linked to a higher 
share of bank lending and lower constraints in finance, public registries do not have a 
significant effect on financing constraints. Our results also do not align with Triki and Gajigo 
(2014), who have concluded that PCBs are more positively connected to financial access 
compared to PCRs. While the consistency of the established results in the light of the extant 
African literature on information asymmetry may be explained by the common anticipated 
theoretical benefits of ISOs in enhancing financial access, the contrasting findings can be 
explained from both the methodological and periodicity frameworks. From the 
methodological view, we have used the GMM, which is not employed by any of the 
comparative studies. On the other hand, the sampled periodicity in this paper is more updated.  
 
5. Concluding implications and future research directions 
 This study investigates whether information sharing channels that are meant to reduce 
information asymmetry have led to an increase in financial access. The study employs a 
Generalised Method of Moments technique using data from 53 African countries during the 
period from 2004-2011. Information sharing channels are theoretically designed to promote 
the formal financial sector and discourage the informal financial sector. The study uses two 
information sharing channels: private credit bureaus and public credit registries. The study 
found that public credit registries complement the formal financial sector to promote financial 
access. Moreover, there is a synergy effect from such a complementarity because both the 
independent effect of the formal financial sector and the combined effect (between public 
credit registries and the formal financial sector) are positive on access to credit. 
 The main implication of the finding is that information sharing offices (ISO) should be 
encouraged as a means of information sharing for access to credit. ISOs also play the role of a 
disciplining device by discouraging borrowers from resorting to the informal financial sector 
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as a viable alternative to the formal financial sector (Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010; 
Coccorese, 2012). The synergy between public credit registries and the formal financial sector 
for access to credit is further evidence of the fact that the introduction of ISOs should be 
combined with policies of formal financial sector development.  
The introduction of concepts of financial sector competition merges two branches of 
research by concurrently contributing to the literature on measuring development finance and 
the economic development literature on the mechanisms by which ISOs can stimulate 
financial sector competition for access to credit. The simultaneous contribution provides a 
practical means to understanding the mechanisms by which access to credit is influenced by 
the complementarity between various financial sectors and ISOs.  
The extant literature can be improved by investigating the established linkages throughout the 
conditional distribution of the access to credit variables. The intuition for this 
recommendation is that policies on the complementary between ISOs and competition within 
the financial sector may be contingent on the initial levels of access to credit. Hence, blanket 
policies may be ineffective unless they are contingent on the initial levels of the access to 
credit and are tailored differently across countries with low, intermediate and high levels of 
access to credit. Moreover, other dimensions of access to credit can be explored, given that 
allocative efficiency goes beyond the transformation of deposits into credit. This is essentially 
because it also entails efficient pricing mechanisms and opportunities for risk sharing. 
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